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basic design

  • 1 navigate

    E-com
    to find your way around the Internet, a Web site, or an HTML document.
         Research has shown that people navigate in a certain way when reading content in a Web site, and certain standards and conventions of navigation are emerging for Web site design. More important than anything else is functionality: visitors want to find the information they are seeking quickly and easily, and are not particularly interested in style.
         The most basic design convention, termed “essential” or “global” navigation, holds that every Web page should have a set of essential navigation tools that are visible when the first screen loads, linking to key areas within the Web site. Essential navigation should contain links such as Home, About, Products, Customers, and Contact.
         It is also important to let visitors know where they are on a Web site, with each page clearly displaying what part of the overall classification it represents. If it is the home page, for example, this should be made clear; or if it is a page dealing with pricing information, the heading at the top of the page should say so.
         Users also find it useful to know where they have been on a Web site—usually done by changing the color of hyperlink s that have been clicked on from blue to purple.

    The ultimate business dictionary > navigate

  • 2 Petzval, Josef Max

    [br]
    b. 1807 Spisska-Beila, Hungary
    d. 17 September 1891 Vienna, Austria
    [br]
    Hungarian mathematician and photographic-lens designer, inventor of the first "rapid" portrait lens.
    [br]
    Although born in Hungary, Petzval was the son of German schoolteacher. He studied engineering at the University of Budapest and after graduation was appointed to the staff as a lecturer. In 1835 he became the University's Professor of Higher Mathematics. Within a year he was offered a similar position at the more prestigious University of Vienna, a chair he was to occupy until 1884.
    The earliest photographic cameras were fitted with lenses originally designed for other optical instruments. All were characterized by small apertures, and the long exposures required by the early process were in part due to the "slow" lenses. As early as 1839, Petzval began calculations with the idea of producing a fast achromatic objective for photographic work. For technical advice he turned to the Viennese optician Peter Voigtländer, who went on to make the first Petzval portrait lens in 1840. It had a short focal length but an extremely large aperture for the day, enabling exposure times to be reduced to at least one tenth of that required with other contemporary lenses. The Petzval portrait lens was to become the basic design for years to come and was probably the single most important development in making portrait photography possible; by capturing public imagination, portrait photography was to drive photographic innovation during the early years.
    Petzval later fell out with Voigtländer and severed his connection with the company in 1845. When Petzval was encouraged to design a landscape lens in the 1850s, the work was entrusted to another Viennese optician, Dietzler. Using some early calculations by Petzval, Voigtländer was able to produce a similar lens, which he marketed in competition, and an acrimonious dispute ensued. Petzval, embittered by the quarrel and depressed by a burglary which destroyed years of records of his optical work, abandoned optics completely in 1862 and devoted himself to acoustics. He retired from his professorship on his seventieth birthday, respected by his colleagues but unloved, and lived the life of a recluse until his death.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Member of the Hungarian Academy of Science 1873.
    Further Reading
    J.M.Eder, 1945, History of Photography, trans. E. Epstean, New York (provides details of Petzval's life and work; Eder claims he was introduced to Petzval by mutual friends and succeeded in obtaining personal data).
    Rudolf Kingslake, 1989, A History of the Photographic Lens, Boston (brief biographical details).
    L.W.Sipley, 1965, Photography's Great Inventors, Philadelphia (brief biographical details).
    JW

    Biographical history of technology > Petzval, Josef Max

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     ■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.
     ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
     ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.
     ■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).
     ■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 4 Kurtz, Thomas E.

    [br]
    b. USA
    [br]
    American mathematician who, with Kemeny developed BASIC, a high-level computer language.
    [br]
    Kurtz took his first degree in mathematics at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA), where he also gained experience in numerical methods as a result of working in the National Bureau of Standards Institute for Numerical Analysis located on the campus. In 1956 he obtained a PhD in statistics at Princeton, after which he took up a post as an instructor at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. There he found a considerable interest in computing was already in existence, and he was soon acting as the Dartmouth contact with the New England Regional Computer Center at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an initiative partly supported by IBM. With Kemeny, he learned the Share Assembly Language then in use, but they were concerned about the difficulty of programming computers in assembly language and of teaching it to students and colleagues at Dartmouth. In 1959 the college obtained an LGP-30 computer and Kurtz became the first Director of the Dartmouth Computer Center. However, the small memory (4 k) of this 30-bit machine precluded its use with the recently available high-level language Algol 58. Therefore, with Kemeny, he set about developing a simple language and operating system that would use simple English commands and be easy to learn and use. This they called the Beginners All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code (BASIC). At the same time they jointly supervised the design and development of a time-sharing system suitable for college use, so that by 1964, when Kurtz became an associate professor of mathematics, they had a fully operational BASIC system; by 1969 a sixth version was already in existence. In 1966 Kurtz left Dartmouth to become a Director of the Kiewit Computer Center, and then, in 1975, he became a Director of the Office of Academic Computing; in 1978 he returned to Dartmouth as Professor of Mathematics. He also served on various national committees.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    1964, with J.G.Kemeny, BASIC Instruction Manual: Dartmouth College (for details of the development of BASIC etc.).
    1968, with J.G.Kemeny "Dartmouth time-sharing", Science 223.
    Further Reading
    R.L.Wexelblat, 1981, History of Programming Languages, London: Academic Press (a more general view of the development of computer languages).
    KF

    Biographical history of technology > Kurtz, Thomas E.

  • 5 Carroll, Thomas

    [br]
    b. 1888 Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
    d. 22 February 1968 Australia
    [br]
    Australian engineer responsible for many innovations in combine-harvester design, and in particular associated with the Massey Harris No. 20 used in the "Harvest Brigade" during the Second World War.
    [br]
    Carroll worked first with the Buckeye Harvester Co., then with J.J.Mitchell \& Co. In 1911 he was hired by the Argentinian distributor for Massey Harris to help in the introduction of their new horse-drawn reaper-thresher. Carroll recommended modifications to suit Argentinian conditions, and these resulted in the production of a new model. In 1917 he joined the Toronto staff of Massey Harris as a product design leader, the No. 5 reaper-thresher being the first designed under him. Many significant new developments can be attributed to Carroll: welded sections, roller chains, oil-bath gears, antifriction ball bearings and the detachable cutting table allowing easy transfer of combines between fields were all innovations of which he was the source.
    In the 1930s he became Chief Engineer with responsibility for the design of a self-propelled harvester. The 20 SP was tested in Argentina only eight months after design work had begun, and it was to this machine that the name "combine harvester" was applied for the first time. Improvements to this original design produced a lighter 12 ft (3.65 m) cut machine which came off the production line in 1941. Three years later 500 of these machines were transported to the southern United States, and then gradually harvested their way northwards as the corn ripened. It has been estimated that the famous "Harvest Brigade" harvested over 1 million acres, putting 25 million bushels into store, with a saving in excess of 300,000 labour hours and half a million gallons of fuel.
    Carroll retired from Massey Ferguson in 1961.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    American Society of Agricultural Engineers C.H. McCormick Gold Medal 1958.
    Bibliography
    1948, "Basic requirements in the design and development of the self propelled combine"
    Agricultural Engineer. 29(3), 101–5.
    Further Reading
    G.Quick and W.Buchele, 1978, The Grain Harvesters, American Society of Agricultural Engineers (provides a detailed account of the development of the combine harvester).
    K.M.Coppick, 1972, gave an account of the wartime effort, which he mistakenly called "Massey Ferguson Harvest Brigade", presented to the Canadian Society for
    Agricultural Engineers, Paper 72–313.
    AP

    Biographical history of technology > Carroll, Thomas

  • 6 Henson, William Samuel

    SUBJECT AREA: Aerospace
    [br]
    b. 3 May 1812 Nottingham, England
    d. 22 March 1888 New Jersey, USA
    [br]
    English (naturalized American) inventor who patented a design for an "aerial steam carriage" and combined with John Stringfellow to build model aeroplanes.
    [br]
    William Henson worked in the lacemaking industry and in his spare time invented many mechanical devices, from a breech-loading cannon to an ice-machine. It could be claimed that he invented the airliner, for in 1842 he prepared a patent (granted in 1843) for an "aerial steam carriage". The patent application was not just a vague outline, but contained detailed drawings of a large monoplane with an enclosed fuselage to accommodate the passengers and crew. It was to be powered by a steam engine driving two pusher propellers aft of the wing. Henson had followed the lead give by Sir George Cayley in his basic layout, but produced a very much more advanced structural design with cambered wings strengthened by streamlined bracing wires: the intended wing-span was 150 ft (46 m). Henson probably discussed the design of the steam engine and boiler with his friend John Stringfellow (who was also in the lacemaking industry). Stringfellow joined Henson and others to found the Aerial Transit Company, which was set up to raise the finance needed to build Henson's machine. A great publicity campaign was mounted with artists' impressions of the "aerial steam carriage" flying over London, India and even the pyramids. Passenger-carrying services to India and China were proposed, but the whole project was far too optimistic to attract support from financiers and the scheme foundered. Henson and Stringfellow drew up an agreement in December 1843 to construct models which would prove the feasibility of an "aerial machine". For the next five years they pursued this aim, with no real success. In 1848 Henson and his wife emigrated to the United States to further his career in textiles. He became an American citizen and died there at the age of 75.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    Henson's diary is preserved by the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences in the USA. Henson's patent of 1842–3 is reproduced in Balantyne and Pritchard (1956) and Davy (1931) (see below).
    Further Reading
    H.Penrose, 1988, An Ancient Air: A Biography of John Stringfellow, Shrewsbury.
    A.M.Balantyne and J.L.Pritchard, 1956, "The lives and work of William Samuel Henson and John Stringfellow", Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society (June) (an attempt to analyse conflicting evidence; includes a reproduction of Henson's patent).
    M.J.B.Davy, 1931, Henson and Stringfellow, London (an earlier work with excellent drawings from Henson's patent).
    JDS

    Biographical history of technology > Henson, William Samuel

  • 7 Bollée, Ernest-Sylvain

    [br]
    b. 19 July 1814 Clefmont (Haute-Marne), France
    d. 11 September 1891 Le Mans, France
    [br]
    French inventor of the rotor-stator wind engine and founder of the Bollée manufacturing industry.
    [br]
    Ernest-Sylvain Bollée was the founder of an extensive dynasty of bellfounders based in Le Mans and in Orléans. He and his three sons, Amédée (1844–1917), Ernest-Sylvain fils (1846–1917) and Auguste (1847-?), were involved in work and patents on steam-and petrol-driven cars, on wind engines and on hydraulic rams. The presence of the Bollées' car industry in Le Mans was a factor in the establishment of the car races that are held there.
    In 1868 Ernest-Sylvain Bollée père took out a patent for a wind engine, which at that time was well established in America and in England. In both these countries, variable-shuttered as well as fixed-blade wind engines were in production and patented, but the Ernest-Sylvain Bollée patent was for a type of wind engine that had not been seen before and is more akin to the water-driven turbine of the Jonval type, with its basic principle being parallel to the "rotor" and "stator". The wind drives through a fixed ring of blades on to a rotating ring that has a slightly greater number of blades. The blades of the fixed ring are curved in the opposite direction to those on the rotating blades and thus the air is directed onto the latter, causing it to rotate at a considerable speed: this is the "rotor". For greater efficiency a cuff of sheet iron can be attached to the "stator", giving a tunnel effect and driving more air at the "rotor". The head of this wind engine is turned to the wind by means of a wind-driven vane mounted in front of the blades. The wind vane adjusts the wind angle to enable the wind engine to run at a constant speed.
    The fact that this wind engine was invented by the owner of a brass foundry, with all the gear trains between the wind vane and the head of the tower being of the highest-quality brass and, therefore, small in scale, lay behind its success. Also, it was of prefabricated construction, so that fixed lengths of cast-iron pillar were delivered, complete with twelve treads of cast-iron staircase fixed to the outside and wrought-iron stays. The drive from the wind engine was taken down the inside of the pillar to pumps at ground level.
    Whilst the wind engines were being built for wealthy owners or communes, the work of the foundry continued. The three sons joined the family firm as partners and produced several steam-driven vehicles. These vehicles were the work of Amédée père and were l'Obéissante (1873); the Autobus (1880–3), of which some were built in Berlin under licence; the tram Bollée-Dalifol (1876); and the private car La Mancelle (1878). Another important line, in parallel with the pumping mechanism required for the wind engines, was the development of hydraulic rams, following the Montgolfier patent. In accordance with French practice, the firm was split three ways when Ernest-Sylvain Bollée père died. Amédée père inherited the car side of the business, but it is due to Amédée fils (1867– 1926) that the principal developments in car manufacture came into being. He developed the petrol-driven car after the impetus given by his grandfather, his father and his uncle Ernest-Sylvain fils. In 1887 he designed a four-stroke single-cylinder engine, although he also used engines designed by others such as Peugeot. He produced two luxurious saloon cars before putting Torpilleur on the road in 1898; this car competed in the Tour de France in 1899. Whilst designing other cars, Amédée's son Léon (1870–1913) developed the Voiturette, in 1896, and then began general manufacture of small cars on factory lines. The firm ceased work after a merger with the English firm of Morris in 1926. Auguste inherited the Eolienne or wind-engine side of the business; however, attracted to the artistic life, he sold out to Ernest Lebert in 1898 and settled in the Paris of the Impressionists. Lebert developed the wind-engine business and retained the basic "stator-rotor" form with a conventional lattice tower. He remained in Le Mans, carrying on the business of the manufacture of wind engines, pumps and hydraulic machinery, describing himself as a "Civil Engineer".
    The hydraulic-ram business fell to Ernest-Sylvain fils and continued to thrive from a solid base of design and production. The foundry in Le Mans is still there but, more importantly, the bell foundry of Dominique Bollée in Saint-Jean-de-Braye in Orléans is still at work casting bells in the old way.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    André Gaucheron and J.Kenneth Major, 1985, The Eolienne Bollée, The International Molinological Society.
    Cénomane (Le Mans), 11, 12 and 13 (1983 and 1984).
    KM

    Biographical history of technology > Bollée, Ernest-Sylvain

  • 8 Language

       Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)
       It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)
       It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)
       Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)
       It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)
       [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]
       Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it
       Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another
       LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)
       We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)
       We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.
       The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
       9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language
       The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)
       It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)
       In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)
       In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)
       [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)
       he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.
       The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)
       The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.
       But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)
       The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)
        t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)
       A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)
       Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)
       It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)
       First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....
       Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)
       If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)
        23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction
       Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)
       By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)
       Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language

  • 9 Clark, Edwin

    SUBJECT AREA: Civil engineering
    [br]
    b. 7 January 1814 Marlow, Buckinghamshire, England
    d. 22 October 1894 Marlow, Buckinghamshire, England
    [br]
    English civil engineer.
    [br]
    After a basic education in mathematics, latin, French and geometry, Clark was articled to a solicitor, but he left after two years because he did not like the work. He had no permanent training otherwise, and for four years he led an idle life, becoming self-taught in the subjects that interested him. He eventually became a teacher at his old school before entering Cambridge, although he returned home after two years without taking a degree. He then toured the European continent extensively, supporting himself as best he could. He returned to England in 1839 and obtained further teaching posts. With the railway boom in progress he decided to become a surveyor and did some work on a proposed line between Oxford and Brighton.
    After being promised an interview with Robert Stephenson, he managed to see him in March 1846. Stephenson took a liking to Clark and asked him to investigate the strains on the Britannia Bridge tubes under various given conditions. This work so gained Stephenson's full approval that, after being entrusted with experiments and designs, Clark was appointed Resident Engineer for the Britannia Bridge across the Menai Straits. He not only completed the bridge, which was opened on 19 October 1850, but also wrote the history of its construction. After the completion of the bridge—and again without any professional experience—he was appointed Engineer-in-Chief to the Electric and International Telegraph Company. He was consulted by Captain Mark Huish of the London \& North Western Railway on a telegraphic system for the railway, and in 1853 he introduced the Block Telegraph System.
    Clark was engaged on the Crystal Palace and was responsible for many railway bridges in Britain and abroad. He was Engineer and part constructor of the harbour at Callao, Peru, and also of harbour works at Colón, Panama. On canal works he was contractor for the marine canal, the Morskoy Canal, in 1875 between Kronstadt and St Petersburg. His great work on canals, however, was the concept with Edward Leader Williams of the hydraulically operated barge lift at Anderton, Cheshire, linking the Weaver Navigation to the Trent \& Mersey Canal, whose water levels have a vertical separation of 50 ft (15 m). This was opened on 26 July 1875. The structure so impressed the French engineers who were faced with a bottleneck of five locks on the Neuffossée Canal south of Saint-Omer that they commissioned Clark to design a lift there. This was completed in 1878 and survives as a historic monument. The design was also adopted for four lifts on the Canal du Centre at La Louvière in Belgium, but these were not completed until after Clark's death.
    JHB

    Biographical history of technology > Clark, Edwin

  • 10 Evans, Oliver

    [br]
    b. 13 September 1755 Newport, Delaware, USA
    d. 15 April 1819 New York, USA
    [br]
    American millwright and inventor of the first automatic corn mill.
    [br]
    He was the fifth child of Charles and Ann Stalcrop Evans, and by the age of 15 he had four sisters and seven brothers. Nothing is known of his schooling, but at the age of 17 he was apprenticed to a Newport wheelwright and wagon-maker. At 19 he was enrolled in a Delaware Militia Company in the Revolutionary War but did not see active service. About this time he invented a machine for bending and cutting off the wires in textile carding combs. In July 1782, with his younger brother, Joseph, he moved to Tuckahoe on the eastern shore of the Delaware River, where he had the basic idea of the automatic flour mill. In July 1782, with his elder brothers John and Theophilus, he bought part of his father's Newport farm, on Red Clay Creek, and planned to build a mill there. In 1793 he married Sarah Tomlinson, daughter of a Delaware farmer, and joined his brothers at Red Clay Creek. He worked there for some seven years on his automatic mill, from about 1783 to 1790.
    His system for the automatic flour mill consisted of bucket elevators to raise the grain, a horizontal screw conveyor, other conveying devices and a "hopper boy" to cool and dry the meal before gathering it into a hopper feeding the bolting cylinder. Together these components formed the automatic process, from incoming wheat to outgoing flour packed in barrels. At that time the idea of such automation had not been applied to any manufacturing process in America. The mill opened, on a non-automatic cycle, in 1785. In January 1786 Evans applied to the Delaware legislature for a twenty-five-year patent, which was granted on 30 January 1787 although there was much opposition from the Quaker millers of Wilmington and elsewhere. He also applied for patents in Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Hampshire. In May 1789 he went to see the mill of the four Ellicot brothers, near Baltimore, where he was impressed by the design of a horizontal screw conveyor by Jonathan Ellicot and exchanged the rights to his own elevator for those of this machine. After six years' work on his automatic mill, it was completed in 1790. In the autumn of that year a miller in Brandywine ordered a set of Evans's machinery, which set the trend toward its general adoption. A model of it was shown in the Market Street shop window of Robert Leslie, a watch-and clockmaker in Philadelphia, who also took it to England but was unsuccessful in selling the idea there.
    In 1790 the Federal Plant Laws were passed; Evans's patent was the third to come within the new legislation. A detailed description with a plate was published in a Philadelphia newspaper in January 1791, the first of a proposed series, but the paper closed and the series came to nothing. His brother Joseph went on a series of sales trips, with the result that some machinery of Evans's design was adopted. By 1792 over one hundred mills had been equipped with Evans's machinery, the millers paying a royalty of $40 for each pair of millstones in use. The series of articles that had been cut short formed the basis of Evans's The Young Millwright and Miller's Guide, published first in 1795 after Evans had moved to Philadelphia to set up a store selling milling supplies; it was 440 pages long and ran to fifteen editions between 1795 and 1860.
    Evans was fairly successful as a merchant. He patented a method of making millstones as well as a means of packing flour in barrels, the latter having a disc pressed down by a toggle-joint arrangement. In 1801 he started to build a steam carriage. He rejected the idea of a steam wheel and of a low-pressure or atmospheric engine. By 1803 his first engine was running at his store, driving a screw-mill working on plaster of Paris for making millstones. The engine had a 6 in. (15 cm) diameter cylinder with a stroke of 18 in. (45 cm) and also drove twelve saws mounted in a frame and cutting marble slabs at a rate of 100 ft (30 m) in twelve hours. He was granted a patent in the spring of 1804. He became involved in a number of lawsuits following the extension of his patent, particularly as he increased the licence fee, sometimes as much as sixfold. The case of Evans v. Samuel Robinson, which Evans won, became famous and was one of these. Patent Right Oppression Exposed, or Knavery Detected, a 200-page book with poems and prose included, was published soon after this case and was probably written by Oliver Evans. The steam engine patent was also extended for a further seven years, but in this case the licence fee was to remain at a fixed level. Evans anticipated Edison in his proposal for an "Experimental Company" or "Mechanical Bureau" with a capital of thirty shares of $100 each. It came to nothing, however, as there were no takers. His first wife, Sarah, died in 1816 and he remarried, to Hetty Ward, the daughter of a New York innkeeper. He was buried in the Bowery, on Lower Manhattan; the church was sold in 1854 and again in 1890, and when no relative claimed his body he was reburied in an unmarked grave in Trinity Cemetery, 57th Street, Broadway.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    E.S.Ferguson, 1980, Oliver Evans: Inventive Genius of the American Industrial Revolution, Hagley Museum.
    G.Bathe and D.Bathe, 1935, Oliver Evans: Chronicle of Early American Engineering, Philadelphia, Pa.
    IMcN

    Biographical history of technology > Evans, Oliver

  • 11 Short, Hugh Oswald

    SUBJECT AREA: Aerospace
    [br]
    b. 16 January 1883 Derbyshire, England
    d. 4 December 1969 Haslemere, England
    [br]
    English co-founder, with his brothers Horace Short (1872–1917) and Eustace (1875–1932), of the first company to design and build aeroplanes in Britain.
    [br]
    Oswald Short trained as an engineer; he was largely self-taught but was assisted by his brothers Eustace and Horace. In 1898 Eustace and the young Oswald set up a balloon business, building their first balloon in 1901. Two years later they sold observation balloons to the Government of India, and further orders followed. Meanwhile, in 1906 Horace designed a high-altitude balloon with a spherical pressurized gondola, an idea later used by Auguste Piccard, in 1931. Horace, a strange genius with a dominating character, joined his younger brothers in 1908 to found Short Brothers. Their first design, based on the Wright Flyer, was a limited success, but No. 2 won a Daily Mail prize of £1,000. In the same year, 1909, the Wright brothers chose Shorts to build six of their new Model A biplanes. Still using the basic Wright layout, Horace designed the world's first twin-engined aeroplane to fly successfully: it had one engine forward of the pilot, and one aft. During the years before the First World War the Shorts turned to tractor biplanes and specialized in floatplanes for the Admiralty.
    Oswald established a seaplane factory at Rochester, Kent, during 1913–14, and an airship works at Cardington, Bedfordshire, in 1916. Short Brothers went on to build the rigid airship R 32, which was completed in 1919. Unfortunately, Horace died in 1917, which threw a greater responsibility onto Oswald, who became the main innovator. He introduced the use of aluminium alloys combined with a smooth "stressed-skin" construction (unlike Junkers, who used corrugated skins). His sleek biplane the Silver Streak flew in 1920, well ahead of its time, but official support was not forthcoming. Oswald Short struggled on, trying to introduce his all-metal construction, especially for flying boats. He eventually succeeded with the biplane Singapore, of 1926, which had an all-metal hull. The prototype was used by Sir Alan Cobham for his flight round Africa. Several successful all-metal flying boats followed, including the Empire flying boats (1936) and the ubiquitous Sunderland (1937). The Stirling bomber (1939) was derived from the Sunderland. The company was nationalized in 1942 and Oswald Short retired the following year.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Honorary Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society. Freeman of the City of London. Oswald Short turned down an MBE in 1919 as he felt it did not reflect the achievements of the Short Brothers.
    Bibliography
    1966, "Aircraft with stressed skin metal construction", Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society (November) (an account of the problems with patents and officialdom).
    Further Reading
    C.H.Barnes, 1967, Shorts Aircraft since 1900, London; reprinted 1989 (a detailed account of the work of the Short brothers).
    JDS

    Biographical history of technology > Short, Hugh Oswald

  • 12 résumé

    HR
    a document that provides a summary of personal career history, skills, and experience. A résumé is usually prepared to aid in a job application. A job advertisement may ask either for a résumé or instead may require a candidate to complete an application form.
         Every résumé should include the following: the jobseeker’s name and contact details; a clear and concise description of his or her career objective; some kind of outline of work experience; and a list of education and qualifications. It is important to customize a résumé to the type of job or career being applied for, and to make sure it has impact: a hiring manager receives an average of over 120 résumés for every job opening.
         There are four basic types of résumé: the chronological, the functional, the targeted, and the capabilities résumé. A chronological résumé is useful for people who stay in the same field and do not make major career changes. They should start with and focus on the most recent positions held. A functional résumé is the preferred choice for those seeking their first professional job, or those making a major career change. It is based around 3–5 paragraphs, each emphasizing and illustrating a particular skill or accomplishment. A targeted résumé is useful for jobseekers who are very clear about their job direction and need to make an impressive case for a specific job. Like a functional résumé, it should be based around several capabilities and accomplishments that are relevant to the target job, focusing on action and results. A capabilities résumé is used for people applying for a specific job within their current organization. It should focus on 5–8 skills and accomplishments achieved with the company.
         The format of a résumé should also be considered—whether it is to be printed out, incorporated into an e-mail, posted on a Web site, or burned onto a CD-ROM. Different layout and design elements, such as the choice of fonts or inclusion of multimedia, are suitable for each medium, and should be thought through carefully.
    U.K. term CV

    The ultimate business dictionary > résumé

  • 13 value-added services

    Mktg
    services that enhance a basic product, such as the design in engineering components or technical support for software

    The ultimate business dictionary > value-added services

  • 14 Barnaby, Kenneth C.

    SUBJECT AREA: Ports and shipping
    [br]
    b. c.1887 England
    d. 22 March 1968 England
    [br]
    English naval architect and technical author.
    [br]
    Kenneth Barnaby was an eminent naval architect, as were his father and grandfather before him: his grandfather was Sir Nathaniel Barnaby KGB, Director of Naval Construction, and his father was Sydney W.Barnaby, naval architect of John I. Thornycroft \& Co., Shipbuilders, Southampton. At one time all three were members of the Institution of Naval Architects, the first time that this had ever occurred with three members from one family.
    Kenneth Barnaby served his apprenticeship at the Thornycroft shipyard in Southampton and later graduated in engineering from the Central Technical College, South Kensington, London. He worked for some years at Le Havre and at John Brown's shipyard at Clydebank before rejoining his old firm in 1916 as Assistant to the Shipyard Manager. In 1919 he went to Rio de Janeiro as a chief ship draughtsman, and finally he returned to Thornycroft, in 1924 he succeeded his father as Naval Architect, and remained in that post until his retirement in 1955, having been appointed a director in 1950.
    Barnaby had a wide knowledge and understanding of ships and ship design and during the Second World War he was responsible for much of the development work for landing craft, as well as for many other specialist ships built at the Southampton yard. His experience as a deep-sea yachtsman assisted him. He wrote several important books; however, none can compare with the Centenary Volume of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects. In this work, which is used and read widely to this day by naval architects worldwide, he reviewed every paper presented and almost every verbal contribution made to the Transactions during its one hundred years.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    OBE 1945. Associate of the City and Guilds Institute. Royal Institution of Naval Architects Froude Gold Medal 1962. Honorary Vice-President, Royal Institution of Naval Architects 1960–8.
    Bibliography
    c.1900, Marine Propellers, London. 1949, Basic Naval Architecture, London.
    1960, The Institution of Naval Architects 1860–1960, London.
    FMW

    Biographical history of technology > Barnaby, Kenneth C.

  • 15 Berliner, Emile

    SUBJECT AREA: Recording
    [br]
    b. 20 May 1851 Hannover, Germany
    d. 3 August 1929 Montreal, Canada
    [br]
    German (naturalized American) inventor, developer of the disc record and lateral mechanical replay.
    [br]
    After arriving in the USA in 1870 and becoming an American citizen, Berliner worked as a dry-goods clerk in Washington, DC, and for a period studied electricity at Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Art, New York. He invented an improved microphone and set up his own experimental laboratory in Washington, DC. He developed a microphone for telephone use and sold the rights to the Bell Telephone Company. Subsequently he was put in charge of their laboratory, remaining in that position for eight years. In 1881 Berliner, with his brothers Joseph and Jacob, founded the J.Berliner Telephonfabrik in Hanover, the first factory in Europe specializing in telephone equipment.
    Inspired by the development work performed by T.A. Edison and in the Volta Laboratory (see C.S. Tainter), he analysed the existing processes for recording and reproducing sound and in 1887 developed a process for transferring lateral undulations scratched in soot into an etched groove that would make a needle and diaphragm vibrate. Using what may be regarded as a combination of the Phonautograph of Léon Scott de Martinville and the photo-engraving suggested by Charles Cros, in May 1887 he thus demonstrated the practicability of the laterally recorded groove. He termed the apparatus "Gramophone". In November 1887 he applied the principle to a glass disc and obtained an inwardly spiralling, modulated groove in copper and zinc. In March 1888 he took the radical step of scratching the lateral vibrations directly onto a rotating zinc disc, the surface of which was protected, and the subsequent etching created the groove. Using well-known principles of printing-plate manufacture, he developed processes for duplication by making a negative mould from which positive copies could be pressed in a thermoplastic compound. Toy gramophones were manufactured in Germany from 1889 and from 1892–3 Berliner manufactured both records and gramophones in the USA. The gramophones were hand-cranked at first, but from 1896 were based on a new design by E.R. Johnson. In 1897–8 Berliner spread his activities to England and Germany, setting up a European pressing plant in the telephone factory in Hanover, and in 1899 a Canadian company was formed. Various court cases over patents removed Berliner from direct running of the reconstructed companies, but he retained a major economic interest in E.R. Johnson's Victor Talking Machine Company. In later years Berliner became interested in aeronautics, in particular the autogiro principle. Applied acoustics was a continued interest, and a tile for controlling the acoustics of large halls was successfully developed in the 1920s.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    16 May 1888, Journal of the Franklin Institute 125 (6) (Lecture of 16 May 1888) (Berliner's early appreciation of his own work).
    1914, Three Addresses, privately printed (a history of sound recording). US patent no. 372,786 (basic photo-engraving principle).
    US patent no. 382,790 (scratching and etching).
    US patent no. 534,543 (hand-cranked gramophone).
    Further Reading
    R.Gelatt, 1977, The Fabulous Phonograph, London: Cassell (a well-researched history of reproducible sound which places Berliner's contribution in its correct perspective). J.R.Smart, 1985, "Emile Berliner and nineteenth-century disc recordings", in Wonderful
    Inventions, ed. Iris Newson, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, pp. 346–59 (provides a reliable account).
    O.Read and W.L.Welch, 1959, From Tin Foil to Stereo, Indianapolis: Howard W.Sams, pp. 119–35 (provides a vivid account, albeit with less precision).
    GB-N

    Biographical history of technology > Berliner, Emile

  • 16 Cartwright, Revd Edmund

    [br]
    b. 24 April 1743 Marnham, Nottingham, England
    d. 30 October 1823 Hastings, Sussex, England
    [br]
    English inventor of the power loom, a combing machine and machines for making ropes, bread and bricks as well as agricultural improvements.
    [br]
    Edmund Cartwright, the fourth son of William Cartwright, was educated at Wakefield Grammar School, and went to University College, Oxford, at the age of 14. By special act of convocation in 1764, he was elected Fellow of Magdalen College. He married Alice Whitaker in 1772 and soon after was given the ecclesiastical living of Brampton in Derbyshire. In 1779 he was presented with the living of Goadby, Marwood, Leicestershire, where he wrote poems, reviewed new works, and began agricultural experiments. A visit to Matlock in the summer of 1784 introduced him to the inventions of Richard Arkwright and he asked why weaving could not be mechanized in a similar manner to spinning. This began a remarkable career of inventions.
    Cartwright returned home and built a loom which required two strong men to operate it. This was the first attempt in England to develop a power loom. It had a vertical warp, the reed fell with the weight of at least half a hundredweight and, to quote Gartwright's own words, "the springs which threw the shuttle were strong enough to throw a Congreive [sic] rocket" (Strickland 19.71:8—for background to the "rocket" comparison, see Congreve, Sir William). Nevertheless, it had the same three basics of weaving that still remain today in modern power looms: shedding or dividing the warp; picking or projecting the shuttle with the weft; and beating that pick of weft into place with a reed. This loom he proudly patented in 1785, and then he went to look at hand looms and was surprised to see how simply they operated. Further improvements to his own loom, covered by two more patents in 1786 and 1787, produced a machine with the more conventional horizontal layout that showed promise; however, the Manchester merchants whom he visited were not interested. He patented more improvements in 1788 as a result of the experience gained in 1786 through establishing a factory at Doncaster with power looms worked by a bull that were the ancestors of modern ones. Twenty-four looms driven by steam-power were installed in Manchester in 1791, but the mill was burned down and no one repeated the experiment. The Doncaster mill was sold in 1793, Cartwright having lost £30,000, However, in 1809 Parliament voted him £10,000 because his looms were then coming into general use.
    In 1789 he began working on a wool-combing machine which he patented in 1790, with further improvements in 1792. This seems to have been the earliest instance of mechanized combing. It used a circular revolving comb from which the long fibres or "top" were. carried off into a can, and a smaller cylinder-comb for teasing out short fibres or "noils", which were taken off by hand. Its output equalled that of twenty hand combers, but it was only relatively successful. It was employed in various Leicestershire and Yorkshire mills, but infringements were frequent and costly to resist. The patent was prolonged for fourteen years after 1801, but even then Cartwright did not make any profit. His 1792 patent also included a machine to make ropes with the outstanding and basic invention of the "cordelier" which he communicated to his friends, including Robert Fulton, but again it brought little financial benefit. As a result of these problems and the lack of remuneration for his inventions, Cartwright moved to London in 1796 and for a time lived in a house built with geometrical bricks of his own design.
    Other inventions followed fast, including a tread-wheel for cranes, metallic packing for pistons in steam-engines, and bread-making and brick-making machines, to mention but a few. He had already returned to agricultural improvements and he put forward suggestions in 1793 for a reaping machine. In 1801 he received a prize from the Board of Agriculture for an essay on husbandry, which was followed in 1803 by a silver medal for the invention of a three-furrow plough and in 1805 by a gold medal for his essay on manures. From 1801 to 1807 he ran an experimental farm on the Duke of Bedford's estates at Woburn.
    From 1786 until his death he was a prebendary of Lincoln. In about 1810 he bought a small farm at Hollanden near Sevenoaks, Kent, where he continued his inventions, both agricultural and general. Inventing to the last, he died at Hastings and was buried in Battle church.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Board of Agriculture Prize 1801 (for an essay on agriculture). Society of Arts, Silver Medal 1803 (for his three-furrow plough); Gold Medal 1805 (for an essay on agricultural improvements).
    Bibliography
    1785. British patent no. 1,270 (power loom).
    1786. British patent no. 1,565 (improved power loom). 1787. British patent no. 1,616 (improved power loom).
    1788. British patent no. 1,676 (improved power loom). 1790, British patent no. 1,747 (wool-combing machine).
    1790, British patent no. 1,787 (wool-combing machine).
    1792, British patent no. 1,876 (improved wool-combing machine and rope-making machine with cordelier).
    Further Reading
    M.Strickland, 1843, A Memoir of the Life, Writings and Mechanical Inventions of Edmund Cartwright, D.D., F.R.S., London (remains the fullest biography of Cartwright).
    Dictionary of National Biography (a good summary of Cartwright's life). For discussions of Cartwright's weaving inventions, see: A.Barlow, 1878, The History and Principles of Weaving by Hand and by Power, London; R.L. Hills, 1970, Power in the Industrial Revolution, Manchester. F.Nasmith, 1925–6, "Fathers of machine cotton manufacture", Transactions of the
    Newcomen Society 6.
    H.W.Dickinson, 1942–3, "A condensed history of rope-making", Transactions of the Newcomen Society 23.
    W.English, 1969, The Textile Industry, London (covers both his power loom and his wool -combing machine).
    RLH

    Biographical history of technology > Cartwright, Revd Edmund

  • 17 Cayley, Sir George

    SUBJECT AREA: Aerospace
    [br]
    b. 27 December 1773 Scarborough, England
    d. 15 December 1857 Brompton Hall, Yorkshire, England
    [br]
    English pioneer who laid down the basic principles of the aeroplane in 1799 and built a manned glider in 1853.
    [br]
    Cayley was born into a well-to-do Yorkshire family living at Brompton Hall. He was encouraged to study mathematics, navigation and mechanics, particularly by his mother. In 1792 he succeeded to the baronetcy and took over the daunting task of revitalizing the run-down family estate.
    The first aeronautical device made by Cayley was a copy of the toy helicopter invented by the Frenchmen Launoy and Bienvenu in 1784. Cayley's version, made in 1796, convinced him that a machine could "rise in the air by mechanical means", as he later wrote. He studied the aerodynamics of flight and broke away from the unsuccessful ornithopters of his predecessors. In 1799 he scratched two sketches on a silver disc: one side of the disc showed the aerodynamic force on a wing resolved into lift and drag, and on the other side he illustrated his idea for a fixed-wing aeroplane; this disc is preserved in the Science Museum in London. In 1804 he tested a small wing on the end of a whirling arm to measure its lifting power. This led to the world's first model glider, which consisted of a simple kite (the wing) mounted on a pole with an adjustable cruciform tail. A full-size glider followed in 1809 and this flew successfully unmanned. By 1809 Cayley had also investigated the lifting properties of cambered wings and produced a low-drag aerofoil section. His aim was to produce a powered aeroplane, but no suitable engines were available. Steam-engines were too heavy, but he experimented with a gunpowder motor and invented the hot-air engine in 1807. He published details of some of his aeronautical researches in 1809–10 and in 1816 he wrote a paper on airships. Then for a period of some twenty-five years he was so busy with other activities that he largely neglected his aeronautical researches. It was not until 1843, at the age of 70, that he really had time to pursue his quest for flight. The Mechanics' Magazine of 8 April 1843 published drawings of "Sir George Cayley's Aerial Carriage", which consisted of a helicopter design with four circular lifting rotors—which could be adjusted to become wings—and two pusher propellers. In 1849 he built a full-size triplane glider which lifted a boy off the ground for a brief hop. Then in 1852 he proposed a monoplane glider which could be launched from a balloon. Late in 1853 Cayley built his "new flyer", another monoplane glider, which carried his coachman as a reluctant passenger across a dale at Brompton, Cayley became involved in public affairs and was MP for Scarborough in 1832. He also took a leading part in local scientific activities and was co-founder of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1831 and of the Regent Street Polytechnic Institution in 1838.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    Cayley wrote a number of articles and papers, the most significant being "On aerial navigation", Nicholson's Journal of Natural Philosophy (November 1809—March 1810) (published in three numbers); and two further papers with the same title in Philosophical Magazine (1816 and 1817) (both describe semi-rigid airships).
    Further Reading
    L.Pritchard, 1961, Sir George Cayley, London (the standard work on the life of Cayley).
    C.H.Gibbs-Smith, 1962, Sir George Cayley's Aeronautics 1796–1855, London (covers his aeronautical achievements in more detail).
    —1974, "Sir George Cayley, father of aerial navigation (1773–1857)", Aeronautical Journal (Royal Aeronautical Society) (April) (an updating paper).
    JDS

    Biographical history of technology > Cayley, Sir George

  • 18 Dassault (Bloch), Marcel

    SUBJECT AREA: Aerospace
    [br]
    b. 22 January 1892 Paris, France
    d. 18 April 1986 Paris, France
    [br]
    French aircraft designer and manufacturer, best known for his jet fighters the Mystère and Mirage.
    [br]
    During the First World War, Marcel Bloch (he later changed his name to Dassault) worked on French military aircraft and developed a very successful propeller. With his associate, Henri Potez, he set up a company to produce their Eclair wooden propeller in a furniture workshop in Paris. In 1917 they produced a two-seater aircraft which was ordered but then cancelled when the war ended. Potez continued to built aircraft under his own name, but Bloch turned to property speculation, at which he was very successful. In 1930 Bloch returned to the aviation business with an unsuccessful bomber followed by several moderately effective airliners, including the Bloch 220 of 1935, which was similar to the DC-3. He was involved in the design of a four-engined airliner, the SNCASE Languedoc, which flew in September 1939. During the Second World War, Bloch and his brothers became important figures in the French Resistance Movement. Marcel Bloch was eventually captured but survived; however, one of his brothers was executed, and after the war Bloch changed his name to Dassault, which had been his brother's code name in the Resistance. During the 1950s, Avions Marcel Dassault rapidly grew to become Europe's foremost producer of jet fighters. The Ouragon was followed by the Mystère, Etendard and then the outstanding Mirage series. The basic delta-winged Mirage III, with a speed of Mach 2, was soon serving in twenty countries around the world. From this evolved a variable geometry version, a vertical-take-off aircraft, an enlarged light bomber capable of carrying a nuclear bomb, and a swept-wing version for the 1970s. Dassault also produced a successful series of jet airliners starting with the Fan Jet Falcon of 1963. When the Dassault and Breguet companies merged in 1971, Marcel Dassault was still a force to be reckoned with.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Guggenheim Medal. Deputy, Assemblée nationale 1951–5 and 1958–86.
    Bibliography
    1971, Le Talisman, Paris: Editions J'ai lu (autobiography).
    Further Reading
    1976, "The Mirage Maker", Sunday Times Magazine (1 June).
    Jane's All the World's Aircraft, London: Jane's (details of Bloch and Dassault aircraft can be found in various years' editions).
    JDS

    Biographical history of technology > Dassault (Bloch), Marcel

  • 19 Diesel, Rudolph Christian Karl

    [br]
    b. 1858 Paris, France
    d. 1913 at sea, in the English Channel
    [br]
    German inventor of the Diesel or Compression Ignition engine.
    [br]
    A German born in Paris, he was educated in Augsburg and later in Munich, where he graduated first in his class. There he took some courses under Professor Karl von Linde, pioneer of mechanical refrigeration and an authority on thermodynamics, who pointed out the low efficiency of the steam engine. He went to work for the Linde Ice Machine Company as an engineer and later as Manager; there he conceived a new basic cycle and worked out its thermodynamics, which he published in 1893 as "The theory and construction of a rational heat motor". Compressing air adiabatically to one-sixteenth of its volume caused the temperature to rise to 1,000°F (540°C). Injected fuel would then ignite automatically without any electrical system. He obtained permission to use the laboratories of the Augsburg-Nuremburg Engine Works to build a single-cylinder prototype. On test it blew up, nearly killing Diesel. He proved his principle, however, and obtained financial support from the firm of Alfred Krupp. The design was refined until successful and in 1898 an engine was put on display in Munich with the result that many business people invested in Diesel and his engine and its worldwide production. Diesel made over a million dollars out of the invention. The heart of the engine is the fuel-injection pump, which operates at a pressure of c.500 psi (35 kg/cm). The first English patent for the engine was in 1892. The firms in Augsburg sent him abroad to sell his engine; he persuaded the French to adopt it for submarines, Germany having refused this. Diesel died in 1913 in mysterious circumstances, vanishing from the Harwich-Antwerp ferry.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    E.Diesel, 1937, Diesel, derMensch, das Werk, das Schicksal, Hamburg. J.S.Crowther, 1959, Six Great Engineers, London.
    John F.Sandfort, 1964, Heat Engines.
    IMcN

    Biographical history of technology > Diesel, Rudolph Christian Karl

  • 20 Ducos du Hauron, Arthur-Louis

    [br]
    b. 1837 Langon, Bordeaux, France
    d. 19 August 1920 Agen, France
    [br]
    French scientist and pioneer of colour photography.
    [br]
    The son of a tax collector, Ducos du Hauron began researches into colour photography soon after the publication of Clerk Maxwell's experiment in 1861. In a communication sent in 1862 for presentation at the Académie des Sciences, but which was never read, he outlined a number of methods for photography of colours. Subsequently, in his book Les Couleurs en photographie, published in 1869, he outlined most of the principles of additive and subtractive colour photography that were later actually used. He covered additive processes, developed from Clerk Maxwell's demonstrations, and subtractive processes which could yield prints. At the time, the photographic materials available prevented the processes from being employed effectively. The design of his Chromoscope, in which transparent reflectors could be used to superimpose three additive images, was sound, however, and formed the basis of a number of later devices. He also proposed an additive system based on the use of a screen of fine red, yellow and blue lines, through which the photograph was taken and viewed. The lines blended additively when seen from a certain distance. Many years later, in 1907, Ducos du Hauron was to use this principle in an early commercial screen-plate process, Omnicolore. With his brother Alcide, he published a further work in 1878, Photographie des Couleurs, which described some more-practical subtractive processes. A few prints made at this time still survive and they are remarkably good for the period. In a French patent of 1895 he described yet another method for colour photography. His "polyfolium chromodialytique" involved a multiple-layer package of separate red-, green-and blue-sensitive materials and filters, which with a single exposure would analyse the scene in terms of the three primary colours. The individual layers would be separated for subsequent processing and printing. In a refined form, this is the principle behind modern colour films. In 1891 he patented and demonstrated the anaglyph method of stereoscopy, using superimposed red and green left and right eye images viewed through green and red filters. Ducos du Hauron's remarkable achievement was to propose theories of virtually all the basic methods of colour photography at a time when photographic materials were not adequate for the purpose of proving them correct. For his work on colour photography he was awarded the Progress Medal of the Royal Photographic Society in 1900, but despite his major contributions to colour photography he remained in poverty for much of his later life.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    B.Coe, 1978, Colour Photography: The First Hundred Years, London. J.S.Friedman, 1944, History of Colour Photography, Boston. E.J.Wall, 1925, The History of Three-Colour Photography, Boston. See also Cros, Charles.
    BC

    Biographical history of technology > Ducos du Hauron, Arthur-Louis

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  • Design rule checking — or Check(s) (DRC) is the area of Electronic Design Automation that determines whether the physical layout of a particular chip layout satisfies a series of recommended parameters called Design Rules. Design rule checking is a major step during… …   Wikipedia

  • Design Line telephone — Design Line is a brand that AT T has used on several of its telephones, also known as Deco Tel. Contents 1 Pre divestiture Design Line 2 Post divestiture design line 3 Gallery 4 …   Wikipedia

  • basic — [[t]be͟ɪsɪk[/t]] ♦♦ 1) ADJ GRADED: usu ADJ n You use basic to describe things, activities, and principles that are very important or necessary, and on which others depend. One of the most basic requirements for any form of angling is a sharp hook …   English dictionary

  • design — ▪ I. design design 2 verb [intransitive, transitive] 1. MANUFACTURING to make a drawing or plan of something that will be made or built: • The theatre was designed by a local architect. • a well designed office • There w …   Financial and business terms

  • design — de|sign1 W1S3 [dıˈzaın] n ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1¦(process of planning)¦ 2¦(arrangement of parts)¦ 3¦(pattern)¦ 4¦(drawing)¦ 5¦(intention)¦ 6 have designs on something 7 have designs on somebody ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1.) ¦(PROCESS OF PLANNING)¦ …   Dictionary of contemporary English

  • design */*/*/ — I UK [dɪˈzaɪn] / US noun Word forms design : singular design plural designs 1) [countable/uncountable] the way that something is made so that it works in a certain way or has a certain appearance a completely new design of car Please note that… …   English dictionary

  • design — 1 /dI zaIn/ noun 1 ARRANGEMENT OF PARTS (U) the way that something has been planned and made, including its appearance, how it works etc: One or two changes have been made to the computer s basic design. | the importance of good design 2 PATTERN… …   Longman dictionary of contemporary English

  • design — de|sign1 [ dı zaın ] noun *** 1. ) count or uncount the way that something is made so that it works in a certain way or has a certain appearance: Please note that the designs may vary from those illustrated. a completely new design of car It ll… …   Usage of the words and phrases in modern English

  • Design methods — is a broad area that focuses on: Divergence – Exploring possibilities and constraints of inherited situations by applying critical thinking through qualitative and quantitative research methods to create new understanding (problem space) toward… …   Wikipedia

  • Design elements and principles — describe fundamental ideas about the practice of good visual design that are assumed to be the basis of all intentional visual design strategies. The elements form the vocabulary of the design, while the principles constitute the broader… …   Wikipedia

  • Basic English — Basic English, also known as Simple English, is an English based controlled language created (in essence as a simplified subset of English) by linguist and philosopher Charles Kay Ogden as an international auxiliary language, and as an aid for… …   Wikipedia

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